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ABSTRACT
When applied to solving real-world problems in the public sector, managerial techni-
ques are likely to evolve over time in response to the context of their implementation.
The temporal dynamics of this evolution and its underlying processes, however, remain
under-researched. To address this gap, we present a qualitative longitudinal case study
of a UK-based knowledge mobilization programme utilizing “facilitation” as a service
improvement approach. We describe the processes underpinning the distortion of
facilitation over time and argue that an uncritical and uncontrolled adaptation of
managerial techniques may mask the unsustainable nature of the resulting improve-
ment outcomes captured by conventional performance measurement.
KEYWORDS Facilitation; service improvement; context; distortion; healthcare
Introduction
How do managerial techniques evolve over time? To address this question, we focus
on the temporal dynamics and mechanisms involved in the evolution of facilitation, a
service improvement approach that can be broadly defined as enabling the processes
of learning in group contexts (Gregory and Romm 2001) and is often deployed to
mobilize (research) knowledge into (professional) practice (Berta et al. 2015; Harvey
et al. 2002).1 Drawing on a qualitative longitudinal case study of a UK-based
healthcare knowledge mobilization programme, we describe the following three
parallel and overlapping practice-level processes, underpinning the evolution of
facilitation over time: (1) prioritization of (measurable) outcomes over the (inter-
active) process, (2) reduction of (multi-professional) team engagement and (3) ero-
sion of the facilitator role.
We argue that an uncritical and uncontrolled adaptation of managerial techniques
may lead to their gradual distortion, undermining their promise to positively affect
organizational learning processes and masking the unsustainable nature of the result-
ing improvement outcomes captured by conventional performance measurement
(Downe et al. 2010). Our analysis highlights the malleability of the “core”
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components of managerial techniques under the influence of powerful institutional
forces. In doing so, it responds to the call to explore the interrelationship between the
host organizations of managerial innovation and their environment (Osborne and
Brown 2005) and reveals potential unintended consequences stemming from the
adaptation of managerial techniques to local contexts advocated by the innovation
and implementation literature (Fervers et al. 2006; Kirsh, Lawrence, and Aron 2008;
Krein et al. 2010; Mariano and Casey 2015).
Our findings are likely to be applicable to a wide range of learning-oriented
managerial techniques, such as the “learning organization” (Ferguson-Amores,
García-Rodríguez, and Ruiz-Navarro 2005; Thomas and Allen 2006) and “commu-
nities of practice” (Bate and Robert 2002; Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder 2002),
particularly when these are deployed in target-driven and policy-dependent contexts.
These approaches can be seen as an attempt to capitalize on the “organic” intra-
organizational learning processes and enhance transitions between individual, group
and organizational levels of learning (Berta et al. 2015; Crossan, Lane, and White
1999; Kislov et al. 2014), thus counterbalancing the much-criticized public policy
emphasis on short-term gains to the detriment of long-term sustainability (Osborne
and Brown 2011). Rather sceptically, this study suggests that the agency of facilitators
deploying these learning-oriented techniques in practice can be significantly con-
strained by the very same macro-level systemic influences that they are expected to
mitigate.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section explores extant literature on
the evolution of managerial techniques, introduces facilitation as a service improve-
ment approach and outlines the research gaps and questions of the study. The
empirical setting and the procedures for data collection and analysis are outlined in
the Case and Method section. The Findings section describes the three micro-level
processes underpinning the evolution of facilitation over time. The Discussion exam-
ines the underlying mechanisms behind the distortion of managerial techniques and
reflects on the role of contextual constraints in this process. This is followed by a brief
concluding section summarizing the contribution, limitations and implications of the
study.
Background
Evolution of managerial techniques
In recent decades, the public sector has experienced an upsurge of managerial
strategies, tools and techniques aiming to increase its effectiveness and efficiency
(Boaden et al. 2008; Collm and Schedler 2014; Osborne and Brown 2011). These
approaches are often viewed as rational, modern and progressive, enhancing the
legitimacy of the adopting organization (Lozeau, Langley, and Denis 2002). Whilst
managerial techniques are often enthusiastically embraced by managers and practi-
tioners involved in service improvement, there is a growing body of critical research
highlighting the difficulties and unintended consequences of their practical applica-
tion (Bate and Robert 2002; Dixon-Woods, McNicol, and Martin 2012; Kislov,
Wilson, and Boaden 2016; McCann et al. 2015; Radnor, Holweg, and Waring 2012).
The fundamental issue is the potential “compatibility gap” between a set of
assumptions underlying the design of a managerial intervention, on the one hand,
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and the actual cultural, structural and political characteristics of the adopting system,
on the other (Lozeau, Langley, and Denis 2002; Teisman 2008). This gap can result in
the mismatch between the intended and actual use of managerial techniques which
has variously been conceptualized as the lack of innovation fidelity (Lewis and
Seibold 1993), misalignment between deliberate and emergent strategies (Omidvar
and Kislov 2016) or incompatibility of the newly introduced knowledge with an
organization’s prior knowledge (Collm and Schedler 2014; Mariano and Casey 2015).
According to Lozeau, Langley and Denis (2002), such a mismatch can take several
forms:
● Customization, which involves both adapting the managerial technique and
adjusting organizational processes;
● Loose-coupling, whereby the technique gets adopted only superficially, in a
ritualistic way, with the functioning of the organization remaining largely
unaffected;
● Co-optation, or corruption, whereby the technique becomes captured and dis-
torted to reinforce existing organizational roles and power structures.
Finally, Lozeau and colleagues use the term “transformation” to denote those (sup-
posedly quite rare) cases of handling the compatibility gap where the adopting
organization modifies its functioning to fit the assumptions behind the managerial
technique and where, as a result, the actual use of an innovation does not signifi-
cantly differ from its intended use.
Difficulties of translating managerial approaches into the public sector should be
analysed in the light of the following three sets of tensions. First, most managerial
innovations are likely to have fluid and negotiable boundaries and can be viewed as a
combination of a “hard core”, which is relatively fixed and stable regardless of the
context, and a “soft periphery”, related to the multiple ways of local implementation
(Denis et al. 2002). The greater the uncertainty about the latter, the more scope there
will be for customization, loose-coupling and corruption.
Second, not only is there a mutual influence between the managerial technique
and the adopting system (Denis et al. 2002), but also the latter is represented by a
number of (often conflicting) professional and managerial groups operating at
different levels of the hierarchy. For example, professionals have been shown to
actively co-opt managerial approaches and internalize them in their practices, thus
reversing managerial control (Kamoche, Kannan, and Siebers 2014). It has also been
noted that securing the support of one professional group can lead to the alienation
of others (Dixon-Woods, McNicol, and Martin 2012; Powell and Davies 2012).
Finally, organizational implementation of managerial innovation is likely to be
shaped by the inconsistent policy context (Currie and Suhomlinova 2006). Many
quality improvement techniques display a contradiction between the rhetoric of
professional empowerment and the command-and-control procedures for auditing
the performance data representing the managerial agenda (Lozeau, Langley, and
Denis 2002). Furthermore, managerial techniques can be “distorted” in a top-down
way to fit the policy imperatives for centralization and target-driven performance
management even prior to the “bottom-up” customization in the process of local
implementation (Addicott, McGivern, and Ferlie 2007).
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Facilitation of service improvement in the public sector
Broadly defined as “a way of developing processes of learning in group contexts”
(Gregory and Romm 2001, p. 453), facilitation is often deployed by the public sector
organizations to enable the mobilization of (research) knowledge into (professional)
practice (Berta et al. 2015; Harvey et al. 2002). Facilitation relies on a designated role
(“facilitator”) encouraging others to reflect upon their current practices in order to
identify gaps in performance, introduce change, enable knowledge sharing and thus
improve the outcomes of service provision. It is usually goal-oriented, follows a team-
based approach and incorporates aspects of project management, leadership, relation-
ship building and communication (Berta et al. 2015; Dogherty, Harrison, and
Graham 2010; Harvey and Kitson 2015). To position the debates around the pro-
cesses and outcomes of facilitation in the context of the broader literature on the
evolution of managerial techniques, it is useful to summarize these debates along the
three generic sets of tensions introduced in the previous subsection.
Variability of interpretations
Whilst the role of a facilitator, the involvement of teams, the articulation of perfor-
mance-oriented goals and the enabling nature of the facilitation process can be
viewed as the “core” of facilitation, its “periphery” is relatively wide. Crucially,
facilitation is a multifaceted intervention, with facilitators often deploying a variety
of other tools and techniques as appropriate in a given context (Dogherty, Harrison,
and Graham 2010; Harvey et al. 2002). The facilitator role can be filled by clinical
professionals, researchers or managers (Harvey and Kitson 2015). The performance
goals of facilitation projects can be specified in a top-down fashion by senior
managers, clinicians and researchers external to the practice setting or can be
collectively determined by clinical teams themselves (Harvey, Kitson, and Munn
2012). It can be designed as a pre-planned and monitored sequence of stages
(Dogherty, Harrison, and Graham 2010) or remain deliberately fluid from the outset,
allowing for greater flexibility and emergence (Tierney, Kislov, and Deaton 2014).
Complexity of the adopting system
Premised on a team-based approach, facilitation cannot be adopted individually, man-
dating a reconfiguration of routines and responsibilities at the individual, team and
organizational levels (Kislov et al. 2014). Involvement in facilitated improvement projects
may differentially affect various professional groups, increasing workload for some of
them (Powell and Davies 2012; Tierney, Kislov, and Deaton 2014). In fragmented
contexts, such as the primary-care sector, facilitating improvement across multiple
organizations can be more problematic than working with intra-organizational project
teams with a history of pre-existing relationships (Kislov, Walshe, and Harvey 2012).
Having a facilitated intervention endorsed at a senior level may increase its formal
adoption but does not guarantee behavioural change and sustainability of improvement
(Tierney, Kislov, and Deaton 2014).
Underlying policy-level contradictions
There is a tension between the formalized, managerialist and goal-oriented aspects of
facilitation, which often means aligning improvement work with nationally mandated
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policy-driven targets (Tierney, Kislov, and Deaton 2014), and the situated, practice-
based and emergent nature of team-level learning processes that are seen as funda-
mental for achieving sustainable change (Berta et al. 2015). On the one hand, as an
approach respecting the collective, situated and practice-based nature of learning,
facilitation may well achieve the improvement goals accepted by the adopting system;
on the other hand, the externally driven target-oriented culture can adversely affect
the horizontal processes of learning and knowledge sharing that facilitation relies
upon (Addicott, McGivern, and Ferlie 2006; Currie and Suhomlinova 2006).
Research gaps and questions
We view facilitation as a managerial technique aiming to achieve service improve-
ment goals through capitalizing on the social nature of organic learning processes
within and across organizations. Its application is likely to be shaped by the negotia-
bility of its “soft periphery”, by the multilevel context of its implementation and by
the tensions played out at the policy level. Exploring these issues can be beneficial for
two reasons. First, it can further develop theoretical understanding of facilitation as a
learning-oriented managerial technique by shifting the focus of inquiry from facil-
itators’ roles, characteristics and practices (Dogherty, Harrison, and Graham 2010;
Petrova et al. 2010) towards the influence structural and institutional constraints can
exert on the emergent, contestable and often ambiguous process of facilitation,
potentially leading to unintended consequences.
In addition, such exploration is beneficial for theorizing the evolution of managerial
techniques in general. Whilst different scenarios of handling the “compatibility gap”
between managerial interventions and the adopting systems have been described, their
analyses predominantly rely on multiple case studies, therefore tending to focus on
cross-case variability, underlying contextual differences and the resulting outcomes of
the evolution (Addicott, McGivern, and Ferlie 2007; Hotho, Saka-Helmhout, and
Becker-Ritterspach 2014; Lozeau, Langley, and Denis 2002). We know less about
how the evolution of managerial techniques actually unfolds in practice as organiza-
tions and teams are trying to cope with multiple contextual tensions.
We address these gaps by presenting an in-depth qualitative longitudinal case
study of a UK-based knowledge mobilization programme relying on facilitation to
achieve evidence-informed change in clinical practice across multiple healthcare
organizations. By analysing the evolution of the initiative’s approach to facilitation
over a 5-year period, we address the following research questions. How does the
interpretation and application of facilitation as a managerial technique evolve over
time? How is its evolution shaped by multiple contextual tensions?
Case and method
The case study was conducted in a 5-year collaborative programme (“Programme”)
involving a university, a National Health Service (NHS) hospital and primary-care
organizations aiming to increase the identification of chronic kidney disease (CKD)
and improve the management of blood pressure in CKD patients by facilitating the
mobilization of existing health research in day-to-day clinical practice. The single
case study approach was selected for the following three reasons. First, the
Programme granted us wide access for longitudinal data collection, made possible
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by the involvement of two of the three co-authors in the earlier stages of its
development and/or implementation. Second, the intensity required for in-depth
exploration of organizational change over time would make contemporaneous invol-
vement in multiple cases rather problematic (Van de Ven and Huber 1990). Finally,
the Programme represented a theoretical case suitable for exploring our research
questions as it explicitly relied on facilitation, deployed designated facilitator roles
and operated in a complex and fragmented context.
The remit of facilitators included guiding and supporting multi-professional
improvement teams (comprised of a practice manager, a general practitioner [GP]
and a practice nurse) that were created in primary-care organizations (“general
practices”), where research evidence on CKD was to be mobilized. Each year, a
new group of general practices was recruited, with three phases of the Programme
included in the current analysis. Facilitators were supported in their frontline activ-
ities by a programme team comprised of a university-based social scientist with
expertise in service improvement, a hospital-based nephrologist (a medical doctor
specializing in treating diseases of the kidneys) and several managers. The changes in
the composition of the programme and improvement teams as well as in the facil-
itator role over the three phases are outlined in Table 1.
A purposive sampling strategy was used, with forty research participants drawn
both from the programme team and participating general practices. Forty-five semi-
structured interviews (30–95 min in duration) served as the main method of data
collection and were conducted (face-to-face or by phone) in three rounds (2010–
2011, 2012–2013 and 2013–2014) to enable longitudinal analysis (Table 2). Five of the
research participants were interviewed twice due to their involvement in the
Programme throughout several phases. Two of the co-authors were members of the
programme team in 2009–2012: the second author participated in the implementa-
tion of the Programme as a facilitator while the third author contributed to its design
as a social scientist. This enabled them to conduct participant observation of meet-
ings and reflect on their first-hand experiences of facilitation in the first half of the
Programme’s lifetime. Joint involvement of researchers and practitioners in the
development, delivery and evaluation of the Programme reflected the
Collaboration’s commitment to coproduction, reflexivity and organizational learning.
The following steps were taken to ensure the validity of research findings. The
study was led by the first author, who was not part of the programme team. The
findings of participant observation provided valuable background information and
served as a source of triangulation, but interviews remained the main source of data
to minimize potential participatory bias. The second author did not participate in
conducting research interviews until after his direct involvement in the practical
implementation of the Programme had ended.2 The third author, who played a key
role in the design of the initial intervention, was not involved in interviewing at all.
Most of the interviews in the second round of data collection were conducted by an
external evaluator independent from the Programme team as part of the broader
evaluation commissioned by the Collaboration.3 Interview questions were deliber-
ately open-ended to elicit rich descriptions and avoid imposing the researchers’
emerging theoretical assumptions on research participants (see Supplemental File 1).
The interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim; transcripts were
coded and analysed with the aid of NVivo software. The first stage of data analysis
was predominantly inductive, involving a series of emergent descriptive codes and
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following a narrative analytical strategy that aimed at the construction of a detailed
story from the raw data. The second stage of analysis aggregated previously identified
contextual factors (e.g. emphasis on targets, recruitment patterns, funding etc.) with a
number of emerging categories informed by the theoretical framework (e.g. “team
engagement”, “soft periphery”, “facilitation” etc.). Matrix analysis (Nadin and Cassell
2004) was deployed to compare and contrast the three phases of the Programme (see
Supplemental File 2). Finally, in an iterative process of refining categories, detecting
patterns and developing explanations, existing codes and categories were transformed
into three main themes (prioritization of [measurable] outcomes over [interactive]
process; reduction of [multiprofessional] team engagement; erosion of the designated
facilitator role), which reflected the processes involved in the evolution of facilitation.
Findings
Prioritization of outcomes over process
In the first phase, enabling “the jobbing staff” in the general practices to introduce
improvement was seen as fundamental to the programme team approach, with
facilitators seen as change agents bringing in the improvement agenda and supplying
the “external energy” to give it some momentum:
. . . You have to have facilitation for effective improvement projects, and the better your
facilitators are, the better you’ll get on, because change management’s really difficult . . . and
you have to bring a little bit of external energy into that. If you left it to normal jobbing staff
on their own . . . they wouldn’t do it, would they, because they’re too busy doing the job. So I
think the facilitation dimension is incredibly important. (R1 – HC1)4
Collaborative improvement methodology, including facilitated feedback sessions in
individual practices, regular whole-day learning sessions for all participating practices
and Plan-Do-Study-Act cycles, and formalized context assessments were used by the
facilitators. The emphasis was put on teamwork, concerted change and spreading
improvement within the general practices:
We did the context assessment with them, and then we would then go back in and discuss the
results of that context assessment, and the whole practice would be involved in that, so real
tangible things that they could then take forward in their practice. . .. (R1 – M1)
Table 2. Research interviews.
First phase of
data collection
(2010–2011)
Second phase of
data collection
(2012–2013)
Third phase of
data collection
(2013–2014) Total
Non-clinical facilitators 2 1 2 5
Clinical facilitators – 2 3 5
Programme team managers 1 1 2 4
General practice managers 5 2 – 7
Practice nurses 3 4 – 7
GPs 7 5 – 12
Hospital consultants 1 – 1 2
Healthcare assistants – 3 – 3
Total 19 18 8 45
GP: General practitioner.
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The second phase of the Programme saw an introduction of a clinical audit tool that
automated most of the register verification work that had previously been done by
the practice staff manually. At the same time, the number and duration of the face-to-
face interactive components decreased, virtually disappearing at the third phase of the
Programme. The collaborative methodology was also toned down and later comple-
tely abandoned, with a growing emphasis on adapting the initial facilitated approach,
which was now seen as too “rigid” and “resource-intensive”, in order to achieve the
measurable outcomes (the number of CKD patients identified and controlled) in a
more cost-effective way:
. . . In the third phase especially . . . people were asked to buy-in to an outcome, and so, rightly or
wrongly, delivering that outcome becomes a primary focus, however you achieve that. (R3 –M2)
This manifested in increasing emphasis on the use of the electronic audit tool at the
expense of creating a team-based shared learning environment for sustaining the
improved management of CKD in the longer term:
. . . We came a little bit more focused on what’ s measureable . . . more target than behaviour
change driven. . .. (R3 – M3)
. . . [The electronic audit tool] became . . . the main theme of the project really . . . It
completely revolves around [the tool]. . .. (R3 – NCF3)
. . . The third phase . . . was more prescriptive in terms of the steps that people went through;
there wasn’t that kind of shared learning environment. . .. (R3 – M2)
Many research participants identified the short-term focus on measurable quick fixes
expressed by the NHS in general, and the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) –
groups of general practices whose governing bodies are responsible for commission-
ing the majority of health services in England – in particular, as the main reason
behind this change:
. . . All [the CCGs] want is the outcome evaluation . . . it’s very interesting and it’s very hard to
measure the benefits of that process and the sustainability of what happened. So they’re
spending their money for an outcome. (R3 – M2)
It was noted that putting an emphasis on measurable outcomes eased the recruitment
of practices through the CCGs as it “seemed to open doors more easily, more
quickly” (R3 – M3) but, similarly to what Tierney, Kislov and Deaton (2014)
observed, did not increase the motivation or enthusiasm of participating general
practices. This theme is developed further in the next subsection.
Reduction of multi-professional team engagement
In the first phase, the multi-professional improvement teams, supported by the
facilitators, were driving improvement in their practices, aiming to involve all general
practice staff:
We had a training session within the practice meeting, for everybody, as to what we were
hoping to achieve at the end. . .. We also spoke to the staff about why we were doing it and
what the benefit would be to the practice, and the patients; and also how they could help. . ..
The practice nurse trained the other practice nurse. . .. Then of course [the GP involved in the
improvement team] trained [the other GP] on how to deal with the blood results that came in
. . . and how to code. . .. So everybody knew what they were doing. . .. (R1 – PM1)
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Despite difficulties (such as resistance to organizational change expressed by some of
the practice staff) that this approach encountered in some practices, most improve-
ment teams managed not only to improve the CKD outcomes but also introduce
improvements to other areas of care. Research participants attributed the success of
the improvement teams to their enthusiasm (these practices were early adopters who
had voluntarily signed up to the Programme) as well as the provision of financial
remuneration to the participating practices, allowing them, among other things, to
provide protected time to the staff involved in the improvement work:
. . . Initially, everybody was saying, “ When are we going to have time, how are we going to
back-fill some of the sessions taken out?” And once there was a reassurance that there were
going to be locums or additional hours covered, everybody was on board with [the CKD
project]. (R1 – PM4)
At the second phase, the practices were still strongly encouraged to create improve-
ment teams and involve the rest of their practice staff in improvement work; the most
typical scenario now included one or two members of the improvement team heavily
involved in the project, with other team members remaining peripheral and the rest
of the practice relatively uninvolved:
My nurses were a bit too busy to get involved with [the project]. So [the healthcare assistant]
has got involved. . . .I think the nurses have missed out really. (R2 – PM6)
. . . Phase one: my understanding was that it would be a self-identified multi-disciplinary
practice team made-up of an administrator, a general practitioner, and a practice nurse. In
the second phase, a lot looser . . . but there was that kind of: if you can, then a multi-
disciplinary team would be great. . .. (R3 – M2)
In the third phase, departure from the initial model continued, with practice nurses
becoming the only professional group involved in running the CKD work:
. . . The doctors had no involvement whatsoever; the nurses did everything they could for the
project, but really . . . were battling it out on their own, a lot of them doing any work that was
to be done in their lunch hours. (R3 – CF2)
Many respondents believed that the lack of interest from most of the practice staff
was related to the lack of protected time (the third phase of the Programme did not
provide remuneration to participating practices) as well as the top-down imposition
of the CKD project on practices by their CCGs, with staff often being unaware of
their organization signing up for it at all until they were contacted by a facilitator:
The first phase: that was just the recruitment of individual practices where these practices
expressed an interest to take part, whereas the further on you moved through the phases it
was a CCG decision to take part. . .. (R3 – M3)
Gradual reduction of general practice engagement from a multi-professional
improvement team doing the CKD work together to practice nurses “battling it out
on their own” was also accompanied by decreasing involvement of the social scientist
and the nephrologist (both strong proponents of “facilitation”) and a growing role of
management in the second and third phases of the Programme, particularly in
relation to controlling the allocation of resources to different activities. Another
important change that gradually developed in the programme team over that time
involved the gradual transformation of the facilitators’ role; this is described in detail
below.
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Erosion of the designated facilitator role
The first phase of the Programme involved two non-clinical facilitators whose main
role was to guide and support improvement teams in their joint improvement work:
. . .[The facilitator] visiting regularly . . . for us it didn’t feel like a pressure, it was more of a
motivation; it helped us keep our enthusiasm. (R1 – GP2)
The [facilitators] told us about the way to register these patients correctly, which we wouldn’t
have done without them telling us, keeping us on our toes really. . . . Because you knew [the
facilitator] was coming in to see you, you had to have that information ready, and you knew
that they were going to give you information of the previous few months . . . so that we knew
exactly where we were up to and where we needed to be. (R1 – PN2)
As the non-clinical facilitators were occasionally seen as lacking legitimacy and
clinical expertise, starting from the second phase, a clinical facilitator with a nursing
background was added to the programme team. Most of the frontline facilitation was
delegated to the new recruit, and by the end of the second phase, the non-clinical
facilitator’s role started to resemble that of a project manager:
. . .[The non-clinical facilitator] stepped up then and was doing more of the liaising with
stakeholders and recruiting more practices, more office-based. I think he took on more of a
management lead . . . I’ve kept him in the loop with what’s happening at the practices but . . .
he’s been pretty hands-off going into the practices. (R2 – CF1)
In the third phase, more part-time clinical facilitators were recruited to the pro-
gramme team. As a response to the disengagement of the general practices described
in the previous subsection, the remit of these facilitators shifted from an initial focus
on “enabling others to implement change” to a heavy involvement in the actual
process of implementation:
. . . A facilitator would be likely to do more, in terms of actually operational stuff that in the
past the practice would have done themselves – a lot slower granted, and probably a lot of
workarounds et cetera, but actually the practice would’ve had to do it – whereas in this third
phase it felt that it was a little more given to them on a plate in a way. (R3 – M2)
This shift from “facilitating” to “doing” was enabled by the professional knowledge
and expertise of the clinical facilitators that the non-clinical facilitators did not
possess:
. . .[The non-clinical facilitators] can’t be tempted into doing certain things for people because
they don’t know how to do them, and they’re not a clinician, or they can’t make a decision
about a particular patient. And clinicians are by nature, you know, our job is . . . to help
people and fix things . . . and there is a risk of taking your skills and knowledge and doing
things for the teams. . .. (R3 – HC1)
It was often reported in the third phase that this approach was the only way to
achieve the objectives of the Programme in many of the general practices due to
multiple constraints, such as the lack of protected time, the absence of clinical
champions and a growing emphasis on achieving performance objectives:
I did so much of the work for them. . .. I don’t think it was a decision so much as the fact that
it just wouldn’t have been done otherwise. . . .Most of the objectives were met, but looking at
it long-term for changes to the practice . . . although the project was completed, and the
outcomes were very good, because I did so much of the work for them I don’t think the
changes in the practice will be as sustainable. (R3 – CF2)
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As the last quote illustrates, at the end of the third phase, the members of the
programme team expressed strong concerns about the sustainability of change in
the long term despite the fact that the “official” project performance indicators (such
as the number of the CKD patients identified and their blood pressure parameters)
were consistently achieved.
Discussion
Evolution of managerial techniques: “soft core” and “hard periphery”?
We have described three interrelated and overlapping practice-level processes that
underpin the evolution of facilitation in the contemporary context of the English
primary healthcare sector. The first process, prioritization of outcomes over process,
denotes the gradual loss of interactive elements of facilitation whilst retaining the
focus on those activities that provide a quicker and less resource-intensive way to
achieve measurable outcomes of improvement. The second process, reduction of team
engagement, describes a gradual disintegration and disengagement of multi-profes-
sional teams whose input is crucial for sustaining improvement within their organi-
zations. The third process, erosion of the designated facilitator role, captures a major
shift from the “enabling” function, which forms the core of facilitation (Gregory and
Romm 2001; Harvey and Kitson 2015; Harvey et al. 2002; Petrova et al. 2010),
towards more conventional project management, service improvement or clinical
activities.
These findings enhance our understanding of the interplay between the “hard
core” and “soft periphery” (Denis et al. 2002) when applied to managerial techniques.
Our case study shows that out of the four core elements of facilitation (the facilitator
role, involvement of teams, articulation of performance-oriented goals and the
enabling nature of the facilitation process), only one (the goals) remained unchanged
throughout the Programme, with other elements being fundamentally transformed or
even replaced by activities that were initially seen as secondary elements (such as
register verification relying on the electronic audit tool). These developments suggest
that managerial techniques may have a “softer” core and “harder” periphery com-
pared to product-based innovations described by Denis and colleagues. This poten-
tially puts managerial innovation at a higher risk of corruption due to privileging
some core elements at the expense of others and replacing these lost core elements
with components of the “periphery”.
We also contribute to a theoretical understanding of how managerial techniques
evolve over time. Whilst Lozeau, Langley and Denis (2002) present customization,
loose-coupling, corruption and transformation as distinct scenarios of closing the
compatibility gap between the proposed intervention and the real-world context of its
implementation, our data indicate that these could be viewed as temporal stages of
the broader evolutionary process. In our case study, the facilitated intervention
progressed from transformation in the first phase of the Programme through custo-
mization and loose-coupling at the second phase (when the initial model started to be
adapted but its core components were not yet completely lost) to corruption in the
third phase, whereby the distorted facilitation approach failed to modify existing roles
and power structures in the general practices and was co-opted for producing out-
comes prioritized by the most powerful stakeholders. As highlighted by the second
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and third rounds of data collection, the evolution of a managerial technique is a
gradual process, which can be hidden behind the rhetoric pertaining to the initial
intervention (also see McCann et al. 2015; Waring and Bishop 2010). For instance,
the use of terms such as “facilitation”, “facilitators” and “improvement teams” lasted
well into the corruption stage, when these terms no longer adequately conveyed the
essence of the distorted intervention.
Service improvement in a constraining context: adaptation or distortion?
In contrast to an instrumental view of service improvement as an active reconfigura-
tion of contextual processes and structures (Damschroder et al. 2009; Kitson, Harvey,
and McCormack 1998), our study demonstrates that formidable contextual influences
can significantly distort improvement approaches, activities and techniques. The
eroding effect of policy-driven targets on sustainable service improvement is realized
through the duality of goals behind the introduction of managerial techniques. On
the one hand, proponents recognize the importance of achieving sustainable change
through promoting education, collaboration and knowledge sharing (Dixon-Woods,
McNicol, and Martin 2012). On the other hand, this aspect usually remains implicit,
unarticulated and elusive, with the outcomes of the “sustainability objective” proving
difficult to capture in a transparent and tangible way, which leads to the prominence
of more quantifiable, target-related improvement goals that are favoured by the
current policy context.
The need to adapt interventions to local context is widely acknowledged in the
innovation and public sector management literature (Fervers et al. 2006; Kirsh,
Lawrence, and Aron 2008; Krein et al. 2010; Mariano and Casey 2015). However,
our data show that whilst facilitators, in theory, can rely on a wide range of tools and
techniques to enable improvement (Smolović Jones, Grint, and Cammock 2015), in
reality, their agency is severely constrained by the context they work in. This can be
explained by the facilitators’ relative lack of power as well as by the strict compliance
of healthcare organizations to the target-focused policy imperatives operating at the
institutional level. This significantly limits opportunities for playing on contextual
contradictions to circumvent constraints – a strategy often associated with more
autonomous and less policy-driven private sector contexts (Hotho, Saka-Helmhout,
and Becker-Ritterspach 2014; Levina and Orlikowski 2009). Moreover, the shift from
“enabling” towards “doing” and “managing” demonstrates that in constraining con-
texts, the designated facilitator roles themselves may become distorted, further under-
mining the interactive, enabling, facilitative aspects of sustainable service
improvement (also see Kislov, Hodgson, and Boaden 2016).
It would perhaps be too simplistic to reduce the distortion of managerial techni-
ques to a contradiction between professional and managerial goals (also see Hewison,
Gale, and Shapiro 2012). Although the disengagement of multi-professional teams
that we observed in the third phase of the Programme can be interpreted as a
manifestation of professional resistance, especially if taken out of context, it should
be weighed alongside the following. We did not find evidence of resistance among
primary-care clinicians in relation to the improvement project goals per se, which
were clinical in nature and endorsed by the local actors in a position of professional
power. In fact, the resistance of professionals predominantly involved their unwill-
ingness (or, rather, inability) to be actively involved in improvement work unless
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supported by the provision of protected time and recruitment of additional clinical
members of staff, neither of which is possible without substantial financial invest-
ment. In addition, differences in the improvement team dynamic between the first
and second phases of the Programme resonate with previous observations that the
interest in quality improvement significantly varies between different organizations
(Krein et al. 2010), with “early adopters” being more likely to be recruited in the
initial phases of new improvement projects (Walshe 2009).
Conclusion
The theoretical contribution of this paper is threefold. First, drawing on the distinc-
tion between the “hard core” and “soft periphery” of innovation (Denis et al. 2002),
we show that the distortion of managerial techniques involves privileging some core
elements at the expense of others and replacing the latter by peripheral components.
Second, we suggest that the four types of handling the compatibility gap between a
managerial technique and the context of its implementation, namely transformation,
customization, loose-coupling and corruption (Lozeau, Langley, and Denis 2002), can
represent stages of the same process rather than distinct independent categories.
Finally, we demonstrate that the agency of facilitators deploying managerial techni-
ques to enable long-term learning and sustainability is significantly constrained and
eroded by the very same macro-level influences they attempt to mitigate, which
makes us question previous observations that facilitative approaches shift “away
from the primacy of organizational outcomes towards the celebration of the sub-
jectivity of the individual” (Perriton 2007, 169).
Our analysis has important implications for current debates around the develop-
ment of designated service improvement roles, such as facilitators, in the healthcare
context. Non-clinical facilitators working in healthcare, whilst having strong interper-
sonal skills and/or improvement expertise (Harvey and Kitson 2015), may lack legiti-
macy, which can be rectified by the deployment of clinicians to fill these designated
roles (Petrova et al. 2010; Shipman et al. 2003). Our findings suggest that whilst both
groups of facilitators have strengths, the evolution of these roles in practice demon-
strates a common tendency to shift away from the interactive, enabling, facilitative
aspects of service improvement. This shift, however, takes a different form in each of
the two cases. Non-clinical facilitators switch from “enabling” (frontline facilitation of
service improvement) to “managing” (i.e. office-based project management and per-
formance measurement). Clinical facilitators, in turn, demonstrate the shift from
“enabling” to “doing” (i.e. involvement in the actual improvement work instead of
supporting and educating others), which is made possible by their professional knowl-
edge and skills (Kislov, Hodgson, and Boaden 2016).
This study is not without limitations. First, we did not manage to recruit primary-
care-based interviewees (such as practice nurses or practice managers) for the third
phase of data collection, limiting analysis to the reflections of the core programme
team. This provides additional evidence of the disengagement of multidisciplinary
teams as a mechanism underpinning the distortion of facilitation. Second, this study
aimed to identify general trends in the evolution of facilitation, and an examination
of variability in the responses of individual general practices to an improvement
intervention was therefore beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, our conclusions
about the impact the evolution of facilitation can have on the local sustainability of
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improvement should be treated as untested propositions until corroborated by
empirical evidence collected after the end of the intervention.
Our analysis is likely to be applicable to a wide range of theoretically informedmanage-
rial techniques and service improvement approaches deployed by public sector organiza-
tions, particularly those relying on purposefully created roles to enable long-term learning
and sustainability. It highlights the need for facilitators, improvement specialists and other
change agents to be conscious of the fine line between the adaptation of service improve-
ment approaches advocated in the managerialist literature and their distortion with an
associated loss of potential to enact and sustain positive change. Finding new ways of
achieving context-sensitive customization of improvement techniques without losing their
core elements could provide a useful direction for future empirical inquiry. We would
particularly encourage an exploration of the following questions. How do successful
adopters and implementers of managerial innovation counterbalance the evolutionary
processes described in this paper? How can the “core” elements of managerial innovation
be “protected” from the eroding effects of public policy short-termism? How can the
“enabling” function of learning-oriented managerial techniques be fostered, maintained
and developed in the longer term?
Notes
1. Following Boyne (2003), we define public service improvement as “a closer correspondence
between perceptions of actual and desired standards of public services” (emphasis in original).
2. Research participants taking part in the third round of data collection were aware of the
previous involvement of the second author in the implementation of the Programme. We
had therefore expected the research participants to demonstrate positive evaluation bias in the
third round of interviewing and were surprised by the critical nature of the actual accounts
received. This could be explained by the trusting relationship between the second author and
research participants enabled by his prolonged engagement of the field as well as by the
Collaboration’s organizational culture encouraging critical reflexivity.
3. This evaluation focused only on the second phase of the Programme, and its process compo-
nent was directly relevant to our exploration of facilitation. The inclusion of the evaluation
interviews in our study was agreed with the external evaluator.
4. The following abbreviations are used to indicate respondents who are quoted in this section: R1 – first
round of data collection; R2 – second round of data collection; R3 – third round of data collection; CF
– clinical facilitator; GP – general practitioner; HC – hospital consultant; M – manager (supporting
facilitators in the programme team); NCF – non-clinical facilitator; PM – practicemanager (based in a
primary care organization taking part in the Programme); PN – practice nurse.
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